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The Willingness to Pay?Willingness to Accept Gap, 
the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and 
Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Reply 
By Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler* 
The purpose of Plott and Zeiler (2005)?henceforth, PZ?was to investigate 
whether previously published experiments using consumption goods such as mugs 
and candy bars to measure gaps between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness 
to-accept (WTA) support endowment effect theory (EET). Our results demonstrate 
that the gap for commodities can be turned on and off by implementing procedures 
designed to control for subject misconceptions about the value elicitation procedures. 
Following experiments traditionally used to demonstrate the endowment effect, we 
used mug valuations to test EET. We used lottery rounds only to provide our subjects 
with paid practice using the value elicitation device prior to employing that device to 
elicit subjects' mug valuations. In a footnote, we report evidence of contamination in 
the lottery data that rendered it inappropriate for our purposes (PZ 2005, fn. 15). Our 
footnote summarized the details of misconceptions reported in a data supplement 
provided to all who request our lottery data. The supplement was not referenced in 
our paper, so we make it available as an online Appendix to our Reply.1 Andrea Isoni, 
Graham Loomes, and Robert Sugden (2011)?henceforth, ILS?use experimental 
procedures similar to ours and observe, just as we did, no gap in mug valuations. 
ILS claim that our 2005 paper is misleading and has misled researchers. They 
are concerned that our paper produces, and has been interpreted as producing, a set 
of procedures sufficient to remove all gaps, including gaps in lotteries. To justify 
their concern they focus on the wording of our abstract and overlook the context 
of paragraphs from which they quote sentences to support their thesis. The result 
is what we consider to be a misleading picture of the content of our paper and the 
facts that we report, namely that mug gaps disappear after we implement controls 
for misconceptions and that none of our data provides support for EET. We want to 
emphasize that our focus was on EET and not on more general theories of prefer? 
ence formation, reference effects and decision processes that have emerged in the 
literature more recently and might explain our results.2 In Section I, we demonstrate 
that we did not make broad claims about our procedures. 
* Plott: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, M/C 228-77, 
Pasadena, CA 91125 (e-mail: cplott@hss.caltech.edu); Zeiler: Law Center, Georgetown University, 600 New 
Jersey Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20001 (e-mail: zeiler@law.georgetown.edu). Thanks to workshop participants 
at Temple University and University of Texas-Austin Law Schools and the Georgetown University McDonough 
School of Business. 
2The online Appendix can be downloaded at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.l01.2.1012. 2 We draw the reader's attention to two important details related to what has been established, (i) EET is an appli? 
cation of more general theories (prospect theory and reference-dependence theory) crafted to explain a specific, 
experimentally defined phenomenon dealing with commodities. According to the theoretical literature at the time, 
EET applies only if the reference point is some sure amount, as ILS note (ILS, fn. 5). The literature of the time 
can be interpreted as claiming that EET makes no prediction when the reference point is set by a lottery. Although 
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ILS make three additional claims. First, they claim that EET "appears to be a 
loosely related family of theories ..." (ILS 2011, p. 994). From their immediately 
subsequent discussion, one might infer that testing EET is a futile endeavor. In 
Section II we demonstrate that EET is well specified and makes clear predictions 
given our experimental environment. We also emphasize that ILS's and our mug 
data do not support EET. When controls for misconceptions about the elicitation 
device are implemented in mug experiments, the valuation gap disappears. 
Second, rather than focus as we do on EET, ILS substitute their own, much differ? 
ent focus: to determine whether our procedures generally eliminate gaps. ILS rec? 
ognize that our procedures contaminated the lottery data and attempt to adjust our 
procedures to control for all contamination that concerned us. Their understanding 
of the sources of contamination, however, is much narrower than ours. In Section III, 
we demonstrate that, despite their attempt to implement a complete set of controls, 
ILS's lottery data are contaminated in the ways we described in our paper (PZ 2005, 
fn. 15) and in our data supplement. A closer look reveals that ILS's lottery data 
contain obvious footprints of contamination and that they were too quick to dismiss 
our concerns as a mere "ex post conjecture" (ILS 2011, p. 1009). Misconceptions 
are evident in the substantial number of irrational valuations reported by subjects. 
Furthermore, misconceptions about random devices appear to cause a shifting in 
subject beliefs about lottery outcomes that is correlated with selling (WTA) and 
buying (WTP) roles. This suggests that subjects perceive the lottery for which WTA 
is elicited as different from the lottery for which WTP is elicited. This phenomenon 
can be interpreted as a failure to measure a gap arising from the valuation of the 
"same good," the only type of gap of interest for testing EET, which depends on the 
shape of a preference relation. 
Third, despite ILS's claim that they "are not concerned with testing any partic? 
ular theoretical account of WTP-WTA gaps," (ILS 2011, p. 995) they take up a 
number of explanations in their conclusion section. In Section IV we discuss the 
two most prominent alternative conjectures ILS offer to explain our mug data. The 
first?the house money conjecture?cannot be tested properly using ILS's data and 
is inconsistent with patterns of data found in the literature. The second ILS theory 
is grounded in the impact of procedures, including emphasis on the role of buying 
and selling and placement of the good, and focuses on how such procedures produce 
perceptions of loss. This theory is problematic because the observations do not rule 
out enhancement effects. Section V offers concluding remarks and makes clear that 
our analysis of the lottery data is consistent with our observations related to the 
nature of different goods (PZ 2005, p. 531). 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler (1990, p. 1343)?henceforth, KKT?briefly mention 
"risky prospects" in their discussion section, Amos Tversky and Kahneman (1991), which KKT (1990) cite as a 
foundational model of loss aversion, state that their theory applies to riskless choice. After we produced our results, 
others developed theories that might be applied to explain gaps in lottery environments (Sugden 2003; Botond 
Koszegi and Matthew Rabin 2006). Our experiments, however, were not designed to test these alternative theories, 
which were not available at the time we were writing, nor do our experiments test theories of decision processes 
such as the theory posited by Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter M. T?dd (2008). 
(ii) We identified a set of procedures that remove gaps in the specific mug experiments cited in the literature as 
direct confirmations of EET, but there may well be other procedures that remove gaps or influence their existence. 
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I. We Did Not Claim that Our Procedures Will Eliminate Gaps in 
All Contexts and that Gaps were Eliminated in Lottery Rounds 
The main claim of PZ (2005) is that the mug experiments that are widely adver? 
tised as supporting EET do not. When procedures are implemented to control for 
subject misconceptions about the elicitation device, no WTA-WTP gap is observed, 
contrary to the prediction of EET. ILS interpret our paper as having made additional 
claims, but the text of our paper and our data supplement, which we sent to ILS upon 
request early on,3 both make clear that these additional claims cannot be attributed to 
us. The supplement clearly stated that we observed gaps in the lottery data. In addi? 
tion, it, together with the text of our paper, identified footprints of misconceptions, 
which we can see now provide the key to a deeper understanding of what the lottery 
data can teach us about valuation elicitation. 
ILS's statement of their perceived problem with our study mischaracterizes the 
nature of our procedures. In their abstract, they assert "... other data from the 
same study, not published in that paper, exhibit a significant and persistent disparity 
when the same experimental procedures are applied to lotteries" (ILS 2011, online 
abstract). This statement is inaccurate in a major (albeit subtle) way. The lottery 
data, in fact, were not produced using "the same experimental procedures." These 
data were produced during practice sessions implemented to remove misconcep? 
tions about the elicitation device used to elicit mug valuations, which eventually 
would be used to test EET. Our procedures call for substantial paid practice prior 
to collecting data for analysis and testing purposes. The lottery rounds were not 
preceded by practice. 
In this section we clarify two important points in an effort to alleviate ILS's con? 
cern that readers will (and have) misinterpreted our conclusions, and, most impor? 
tant, to make sure readers understand what is learned from PZ (2005). First, readers 
of the full text of PZ (2005) will find that we did not claim the procedures are 
sufficient to control for misconceptions related to lotteries. Second, readers cannot 
reasonably conclude that we looked for but found no gaps in the lottery data. 
A. PZ (2005) Do Not Claim that the Procedures Remove All Gaps 
ILS state that PZ (2005) "has been widely cited as providing experimental support 
for the hypothesis that the PZ elicitation procedure eliminates WTP-WTA dispari? 
ties in general" (ILS 2011, p. 993). This claim rests on two sentences in our abstract, 
which might mislead the reader if read in isolation. The sentences in the PZ abstract 
read, "Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and mugs, goods frequently 
used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified procedures, we observe 
no gap between WTA and WTP" (PZ 2005, p. 530). The abstract should have read, 
"Experiments were conducted using lotteries as training tools. Endowment effect 
theory was tested using mugs, goods traditionally used for the development and 
testing of endowment effect theory." 
3 The data supplement includes all lottery data and an explanation of the problems we discovered when we ana? 
lyzed them. We summarized the problems in the 2005 paper. 
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When PZ (2005) is taken as a whole, it is clear we did not claim that the proce? 
dures are sufficient to control for misconceptions in all contexts. In fact, we went to 
great lengths to caution against such a broad interpretation of our results. In several 
other parts of the paper, we explicitly state that we make no claims about having dis? 
covered a set of procedures that remove all sources of misconceptions (e.g., "...we 
have neither a general theory of what might constitute misconceptions nor a set of 
operational definitions characterizing them. Constructing a full set of procedures to 
control for them could be very difficult" (PZ 2005, p. 543); "... the concept of mis? 
conceptions has not been operationalized formally and certainly not quantified. In 
fact, its meaning changes from one experimental environment to another, and from 
experimental study to experimental study. Consequently, a theory of misconcep? 
tions has not been developed" (PZ 2005, p. 531)). We included these statements in 
the paper specifically to ensure that readers would not interpret claims made about 
the procedures too broadly. As a general matter, we encourage readers to develop 
impressions based on our full text.4 
B. PZ (2005) Did Not Claim that Gaps were Eliminated in Lottery Rounds 
While ILS assert that readers of PZ (2005) believe that we looked for and found 
no gaps in the lottery data, a closer look demonstrates that readers who read parts 
of the paper not quoted by ILS along with ILS's quotes are very unlikely to draw 
such a conclusion. While ILS focus on the text in our abstract and concluding sec? 
tion to claim that readers will interpret us as claiming that we eliminated gaps in 
the lottery rounds (ILS 2011, p. 993), in other parts of the paper that focus on the 
results themselves, we make it clear that we did not include the lottery rounds in our 
analysis. Our footnote 15 states that the lottery data collected during training rounds 
were not used (and should not be used) to test EET. We described features of the 
data suggesting that they should not be used to test EET and would be a challenge 
to any preference-based theory. 
Finally, the studies referenced by ILS as examples of misinterpretations seem not 
to misinterpret our claims, contrary to ILS's suggestions. None of the quotes men? 
tions lottery rounds, and some explicitly mention mug rounds. The quotes simply 
summarize our claim that observed gaps cannot be used to support EET, and the data 
suggest misconceptions are key. 
II. ILS's Mug Data Reject Endowment Effect Theory 
Before we address ILS's main concern, it is important to remind the reader about 
our study's major claims and purposes and to emphasize that ILS's mug round data 
4 As a warning to ILS readers, we note here that ILS sometimes quote from context, omitting key qualifying 
phrases. For example, while attempting to establish that we made broad claims about the removal of gaps in general, 
ILS include only part of the following quote: "The 'primary conclusion' they derive from the data they report is 
that 'observed WTP-WTA gaps do not reflect a fundamental feature of human preferences' ...." (ILS 2011, p. 992). 
"That is, endowment effect theory does not seem to explain observed gaps'" (PZ 2005, p. 542). ILS omit the last 
italicized sentence thereby substantially changing the meaning of our text. This sentence, along with many other 
statements in our paper, make it clear that we properly focus on experiments using commodities that allow for clean 
tests of EET. The full quote clearly indicates that we made no claim about all WTP-WTA gaps in all circumstances 
and unrelated to EET tests. 
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unambiguously reject EET. While ILS claim not to be concerned with explaining 
observed gaps5 (or at least with testing EET6), the purpose of our study clearly is to 
test EET.7 We find that gaps observed in KKT (1990) mug experiments are not due 
to a kink at the endowment as posited by EET. When the experiment is controlled 
for subject misconceptions about the elicitation device, the valuation gap disap? 
pears. ILS conduct experiments with mugs using our procedures. Their mug data 
confirm our basic conclusion. 
Our study was designed specifically to focus on particular experiments developed 
to demonstrate EET at work?the case of mug experiments, where all alternative 
explanations seem to be ruled out. Data from both PZ (2005) and ILS demonstrate 
that experiments advanced in the literature as support for EET (i.e., experiments 
asking subjects to state valuations for goods such as candy and mugs) fail to produce 
gaps when controls designed to address misconceptions about the elicitation device 
are implemented. Thus, ILS contribute to the literature by replicating (using modi? 
fied procedures) the key PZ (2005) result, adding to the data from other experiments 
that challenge EET as it was originally developed and applied. 
ILS avoid a discussion of the relationship between their data and EET by claiming 
that "PZ do not set out EET as a specific formal theory" (ILS 2011, p. 994). They 
argue "[a]s used by PZ, 'EET' appears to refer to a loosely related family of theories 
of reference-dependent preferences which has evolved and diverged over time ..." 
(ILS 2011, p. 994), concluding that it is impossible to determine whether data sup? 
port or reject the theory. They justify their avoidance of the issue by arguing that 
"[s]ince EET is not a sharply defined concept, engagement with those issues would 
be an unhelpful distraction from the point of our paper" (ILS 2011, p. 995). 
This characterization of EET and our study is inaccurate. Contrary to ILS's claim, 
EET is a precisely stated theory with unambiguous predictions that apply general? 
ly.8 KKT (2008, Figure 2) provide a clear formulation of EET derived directly from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991, pp. 1046-7). The figure displays an indifference 
curve with a kink at the endowment, indicating that the marginal valuation for a 
reduction of the quantity of a good exceeds the marginal valuation for an increase in 
the good. In other words, the prediction that WTA exceeds WTP is deduced directly 
from Tversky and Kahneman's (1991) axioms.9 While ILS claim that EET generates 
no unambiguous predictions,10 the developers and appliers of the theory harbor no 
5"[W]e are not concerned with testing any particular theoretical account of WTP-WTA gaps" (ILS 2011, p. 995). 
6"[W]e are not concerned with PZ's interpretation of what they call EET. Nor are we concerned with whether 
PZ's or our own data are consistent with EET" (ILS 2011, p. 995). Later in the paper, ILS design experiments to 
test a house money effect explanation and other explanations for gaps in mug rounds. 7 We clearly state in our title, abstract, and throughout the paper that our experiment is designed specifically to 
test EET. 
8 Our paper refers to two of many specific descriptions of the purported link between valuation gaps and prospect 
theory (PZ 2005, p. 531). 9 Note that EET is a theory of preferences as opposed to a theory of a decision process as developed by Gigerenzer 
and Todd (2008) or a hybrid of preference and process as postulated by the discovered preference hypothesis (Plott 
1996). When describing the experiments with mugs, KKT (1990, p. 1346 ) are clear that the shape of the indif? 
ference curves and the role of the endowment are important features of the theory: "To conclude, the evidence 
reported here offers no support for the contention that observations of loss aversion and the consequential evaluation 
disparities are artifacts; nor should they be interpreted as mistakes likely to be eliminated by experience, training, 
or 'market discipline.' Instead, the findings support an alternative view of endowment effects and loss aversion as 
fundamental characteristics of preferences." 
10KKT (1990) do mention some contexts in which EET might not predict a gap (e.g., goods held for resale and 
induced-value tokens), but none of these contexts is relevant for our mug experiment. 
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such hesitations. For example, Knetsch, Fang-Fang Tang, and Thaler (2001, p. 257) 
conclude, "The endowment effect and loss aversion have been among the most robust 
findings of the psychology of decision making. People commonly value losses much 
more than commensurate gains independent of transactions costs, income effects or 
wealth constraints." KKT (1990, p. 1345) also express confidence in the reliability 
with which the theory can be applied, holding that its consequences can be observed 
in property rights acquired by historic accident or fortuitous circumstances, gov? 
ernment licenses, landing rights, transferable pollution permits, divisions, plants, 
product lines, etc. Those applying EET in legal contexts have made similar claims.11 
EET has been applied widely in economics and other fields, and gaps observed 
in the laboratory are used as evidence of the reliability of the theory as it is applied 
in the field. The applications assume that a kink exists at the endowment as opposed 
to other contextual reference points. Our experiment design was meant specifically to 
test whether the laboratory evidence conventionally used to support EET (i.e., mug 
experiments) would hold up when misconceptions about the elicitation device were 
controlled. Our data, ILS's data, and others' data reject EET when put to that test. 
III. Lottery Data Contamination 
The purpose of our lottery rounds was to provide our subjects with paid prac? 
tice to help them understand the properties of the Gordon M. Becker-Morris H. 
DeGroot-Jacob Marschak (1964)?henceforth, BDM?mechanism and the mean? 
ing and consequences of expressing bids and asks in the BDM context.12 During the 
practice rounds, we elicited valuations for four certainty lotteries in which the out? 
come was a small amount of money for certain,13 in addition to two small-stakes, 
noncertainty lotteries and eight larger stakes, noncertainty lotteries, the outcomes 
of which were determined randomly. While we were curious whether the train? 
ing rounds produced useful data, even though they were preceded by no training, 
our analysis of the data revealed patterns that suggest an appropriate experimental 
design and control were so lacking that we had no hope of being able to include a 
convincing analysis of the data. 
ILS attempt to develop a set of experimental procedures that remove "all con? 
tamination" from lottery choices that we identified in our paper. Indeed, ILS define 
as their major purpose to determine whether a WTP-WTA gap remains in the 
11 "Researchers in behavioral decision theory have developed a growing line of evidence that people appear 
to value a good that they own much more than an identical good that they do not own .... Researchers have 
used several different procedures to demonstrate the endowment effect" (Jeffery J. Rachlinski and Forest Jourden 
1998, p. 1551). Rachlinski and Jourden go on to argue that endowment effect theory explains why litigants expend 
resources to appeal judicial decisions that strip them of property rights even in cases in which the court awards dam? 
ages to compensate for the loss. Similarly, Peter H. Huang (2004) suggests that valuation disparities impact settle? 
ment behavior of litigants. Law reviews house hundreds of similar applications of endowment effect theory to law. 12 Given the role of the training rounds, lotteries appealed to us. Using lotteries for training was more efficient 
than consumer goods because we did not have to have a large number of different commodities on hand for each 
training decision of each session. 
13Given ILS's inferences from a paragraph taken from our instructions ("This passage seems to be advising 
subjects to use the small-stakes lottery tasks as practices for the large-stakes lottery tasks and possibly (in the case of 
treatments 1 and 3) also for the mug task ..." (ILS 2011, p. 998)), we worry that readers will make the unsupported 
assumption that we concluded that the four degenerate and two other small-stakes lottery rounds were sufficient 
for training. ILS's interpretation does not reflect our intentions. Our goal was simply to motivate subjects to pay 
attention during the small-stakes rounds. 
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lottery rounds after controlling for all sources of contamination.14 They describe 
their experiment as an "uncontaminated replication of PZ's experiment" (ILS 2011, 
p. 995). In our view, however, it does not control for contamination that we identi? 
fied and discussed. ILS rejected our analysis of misconceptions as ad hoc theorizing. 
Unfortunately they did not check their data for the footprints we identified, and it 
turns out that the ILS experiments contain the same evidence of contamination that 
we identified in our lottery data. 
Relative to our concept of what constitutes lottery data contamination, ILS use 
a narrower definition. ILS use the term "contamination" to describe specific pro? 
cedures related to the order of the lottery rounds and the personal communications 
between subjects and the experimenter during the practice rounds.15 By contrast, our 
footnote 15 develops the foundation for our analysis?"The lottery round data ... 
are contaminated by a design that was developed only for training and not for pur? 
poses of measuring a gap" (PZ 2005, fn. 15). Our paper attempts to make clear that 
we designed the lottery rounds with the single purpose of providing subjects with 
paid practice with the elicitation device that would subsequently be used to elicit 
mug valuations to test EET. We neglected all other aspects of training necessary for 
subjects to understand lotteries. Indeed, for the lottery rounds we made no attempt 
to apply the revealed theory method, which was central to our paper.16 
Our footnote 15 continues with a list of both sources and hints of subject mis? 
conceptions related to the elicitation device, the nature of randomization and the 
concept of probability, all of which bear on lottery valuations. The list summarizes 
the misconceptions analysis contained in a data supplement that we made available 
to everyone interested in the lottery data, including ILS. When we conducted our 
study, our view was that the data were not useful for testing EET and possibly not 
useful for testing any other theory of preference; thus, encouraged by the editor to 
save space, we saw no need to mention the lottery data analysis in our paper beyond 
the brief summary that we included. Of course, ILS are correct in assuming that if 
one wishes to study lottery valuations then special effort must be made to examine 
subject-experimenter interactions, otherwise one cannot be sure exactly what exper? 
iment was conducted. Contamination, however, is a much broader concept than ILS 
assume. Looking over our lottery data again, together with ILS's data, brings the 
problems we detected and reported into clearer focus. 
Our data supplement reports gaps in the lottery data. It also reveals footprints 
of misconceptions about random devices that we identified by analyzing the lot? 
tery data in light of subject debriefs that provided hints about where to look. More 
specifically, we reported evidence of irrational valuations, evidence that subjects' 
subjective probabilities might be influenced by the valuation measurement and inex? 
plicable risk preference patterns. We find the same footprints of misconceptions in 
14"In mounting our study, our primary objective was to apply PZ's elicitation procedure to both mugs and lot? 
teries while ensuring that none of the paid tasks was contaminated. (ILS 2011, p. 994). 15 "All WTA rounds were conducted prior to the WTP rounds," and "Mistake corrections, public answers to ques? 
tions and other procedures were also employed continuously ..." (PZ 2005, fn. 15). ILS interpret our footnote 15 to 
mean that if these two sources of contamination are properly controlled (or otherwise explained away), the lottery 
data will be useful for determining whether gaps are linked to misconceptions. 16 A first cut at applying revealed theory methodology to lottery rounds can be found in a separate online 
Appendix available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?,doi=10.1257/aer.l01.2.1012. 
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Table 1?Proportion of Irrational Valuations for Certainty Lotteries 
Lottery #1 Lottery #2 Lottery #4 Lottery #5 
Certain payoff 
ILS 
PZ (2005) 
20 cents / pence 30 cents / pence 30 cents / pence 40 cents / pence 
28 percent 24 percent 19 percent 22 percent 
3 percent 3 percent 3 percent 5 percent 
the ILS lottery data, and closer study reveals patterns in the data that challenge ILS's 
enterprise of using lottery valuations to measure WTP-WTA gaps. 
While we presented no general theory of misconceptions, the existence of foot? 
prints of misconceptions about the random device implies that misconceptions 
cannot be ruled out as an explanation of patterns observed in the lottery data. In 
the remainder of this section, we provide a preliminary analysis of our conjectures 
related to the lottery data. The data suggest that our training procedures are inap? 
propriate for eliciting lottery valuations. These are the footprints of contamination 
that our footnote 15 and data supplement report. 
The natural places to look for evidence of misconceptions are those in which the 
indicators are uncontroversial and clear. For this reason, we first examine subject 
valuations of the four lotteries with certain payoffs. Under the BDM procedure, the 
dominant strategy is to value certainty lotteries at the certain value. Presumably, 
any irrational choices expressed in these lotteries reflect misconceptions, misunder? 
standing or confusion on the part of the subjects. 
A close look at ILS's lottery data reveals substantial irrationality, both in general 
and relative to our lottery data. As ILS explain, their subjects' and fixed offers were 
restricted to multiples of ? 0.05. Thus, the only rational valuations for a lottery with 
a certain payoff of x are x and (x + 0.05) for sellers (WTA) and x and (x 
- 
0.05) 
for buyers (WTP). Table 1 reports the proportion of irrational valuations reported 
by ILS's subjects and our subjects for the four lotteries with certain outcomes. For 
example, in Lottery #1, 28 percent of ILS's subjects failed to state a rational value 
for a lottery that paid 20 pence with certainty. On average, in each certainty lottery 
round, roughly 23 percent of ILS's subjects exhibited irrationality in this seemingly 
simple task. The irrationality displayed by ILS's subjects is approximately seven 
times higher than that displayed by our subjects; roughly 3.4 percent of our subjects' 
valuations, on average per round, were irrational. ILS suggest that their modifica? 
tions of our procedures removed all contamination, but their data demonstrate that 
they did not. 
The difference between ILS's and our data is striking, and we can only speculate 
about the reasons. As we explained in our paper, we detected what appeared to us to 
be a substantial lack of understanding of BDM during the early training rounds and 
used hands-on methods to correct it. ILS, following our footnote, viewed the hands 
on procedures as a possible source of contamination from an experiment design per? 
spective and employed computerized instructions that involved different methods. 
The levels of irrational behavior exhibited in ILS's data, however, suggest that either 
our training procedures did at least some work to reduce some misconceptions or the 
procedures they used generated additional misconceptions. 
A. Irrational Choices 
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Irrational valuations of noncertainty lotteries are similarly signaled by valuations 
that fall outside the support of a lottery value's probability distribution (when pay? 
offs are positive). If a lottery has a zero probability of paying more than x and a 
zero probability of paying less than y, then valuations above x or below y violate 
rationality postulates. The ILS noncertainty lottery data exhibit very little irrational? 
ity according to this definition, and thus stand in sharp contrast to their certainty 
lottery data discussed above. Indeed, the change in behavior between certainty and 
noncertainty lotteries is dramatic. On average, in the noncertainty lottery rounds, 
3.6 percent of ILS's subjects reported irrational valuations, as defined in the subsec? 
tion above, whereas 22 percent exhibited irrational behavior in lottery #5, the last 
certainty lottery round. While further investigation is required to determine the fac? 
tors driving this phenomenon, the sudden change in behavior?substantial irratio? 
nality in a simple task to almost no irrationality in a more complex task?is another 
footprint of misconceptions. In the following section, we provide a more detailed 
examination of the nature of the misconceptions suggested by both sets of data. 
B. Boundary Valuations 
All ILS and PZ lotteries take the same form. Each results in a payout of x with 
probability P(x) and a payout of y with probability 1 
? 
P(x). The preference elici 
tation procedures are designed to elicit the subject's lottery value, V. Under such 
conditions, standard models of risky choice, including the model ILS adopt, hold 
that V = x if and only if P(x) = 1, and V = y if and only if P(x) = 0. This property 
is true regardless of the level of risk aversion.17 Thus a valuation at the boundary of 
a lottery payoff support suggests an extreme belief over the outcome probabilities. 
Of course this model assumes that possible lottery outcomes are continuous and 
that utility functions are smooth. If these mathematical properties are viewed only 
as approximations, boundary valuations imply beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
objective probabilities of the lottery value supports. In other words, under such sim? 
plifying assumptions, the existence of boundary valuations is evidence that subjects 
have misconceptions about randomness. We hasten to add that an individual choice 
model assuming a kink in the preference relation at a possible reference point might 
be consistent with the lottery data (although in some cases, it might require extreme 
levels of loss aversion). Thus, the discussion of this section must be considered as 
tentative conjectures. 
To investigate footprints of misconceptions in the noncertainty large-stakes lottery 
rounds, we focus on "boundary valuations." We define boundary valuations as valu? 
ations that lie exactly on the bounds of the support or irrationally outside the bounds. 
For example, ILS lottery #13 (a buying task) paid ?3.5 with probability 0.5 and 
<? 1.5 with probability 0.5; thus, all valuations at ? 3.5 or above are counted as "at or 
above the upper bound of the value support," and in this case 5 (5 percent) of ILS's 
subjects reported such valuations. All valuations at ? 1.5 or below are counted as 
"at or below the lower bound of the value support," and in this case 15 (15 percent) 
of ILS's subjects reported such valuations. Even though valuations exactly on the 
17 ILS 2011 reference constant absolute risk aversion as a measure of attitudes toward risk. 
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Table 2?Boundary Valuations for Uncertain Large-Stake Lotteries 
1021 
ILS PZ (2005) 
WTA boundary 
valuations 
WTP boundary 
valuations 
WTA boundary 
valuations 
WTP boundary 
valuations 
Lotteries 7, 8, 9, 10 Lotteries 11,12,13,14 Lotteries 7,810a Lotteries 1 l,12,14a 
Valuations at or above 
the upper bound of the 
value support 
Valuations at or below 
the lower bound of the 
value support 
7.3 percent (29) 3.8 percent (15) 
1.8 percent (7) 14.0 percent (56) 
7.7 percent (17) 3.2 percent (7) 
0.9 percent (2) 5.0 percent (11) 
Note: ILS N = 400 (100 subjects, each valuing four lotteries); PZ (2005) N 
= 222 (74 subjects, each valuing three 
lotteries). 
aPZ (2005) lotteries 9 and 13 have a negative lower bound. 
bounds are not strictly irrational as defined in the previous subsection, these valua? 
tions are sufficiently extreme to challenge reasonable assumptions related to belief 
formation. Table 2 displays the frequencies of boundary valuations for large-stakes, 
noncertainty lotteries. In both experiments, subjects valued large-stakes lotteries as 
sellers (WTA) in rounds 7-10 and as buyers (WTP) in rounds 11-14. 
Several features of the data are instructive. First, ILS subjects more frequently 
reported boundary valuations. On average each round, 13.4 percent of ILS's subjects 
reported boundary valuations; 8.2 percent of our subjects, on average across rounds, 
reported such valuations (counting only lotteries with nonnegative outcomes?lot? 
teries #9 and #13 had a negative lower bound in our experiment). 
While the ILS boundary valuations are more frequent than ours, both are suspi? 
ciously large. Given the experimental environment, these subjects do not exhibit 
sophisticated beliefs over lottery outcomes and are acting as if they know the lot? 
tery outcome with certainty, a phenomenon that we reported in our paper and in 
the data supplement. 
C. "Boundary Valuation Asymmetries" 
and a "Question-Influenced Beliefs Conjecture" 
A closer look at Table 2 reveals that subject beliefs appear to be directly influenced 
by whether they are asked to state their WTA or WTP. That is, the boundary valua? 
tions suggest a tendency for these subjects to believe that the high payoff will occur 
with certainty when they are asked for a selling price (WTA) and that the low payoff 
will occur with certainty when they are asked how much they would pay (WTP). We 
reported this phenomenon in our data supplement but considered it evidence only 
of contamination as opposed to a phenomenon that might be worthy of independent 
study. A quick search through the literature reveals that others have reported closely 
related phenomena elsewhere (e.g., Jane L. Risen and Thomas Gilovich 2007). 
A "boundary valuation asymmetry" or, more generally, the support for a question 
influenced beliefs conjecture appears as the asymmetric tendency for subjects to 
be more likely to report boundary valuations at or above the upper bound in sell? 
ing (WTA) rounds and at or below the lower bound in buying (WTP) rounds. For 
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example, when asked to report WTA, 7.3 percent of ILS's subjects reported a value 
at or above the upper bound while 1.8 percent of their subjects choose at or below 
the lower bound, a ratio of just over 4 to 1. When their subjects were asked to report 
WTP, however, the ratio of upper to lower bound choices reverses to roughly 1 to 
4 (3.8 percent versus 14.0 percent). Our subjects exhibited the same tendency: for 
WTA, the ratio of upper to lower bound values was 8.5 to 1, and for WTP it fell to 
1 to 1.6.18 
Simply put, the data support a question-influenced beliefs conjecture. Specifically, 
the conjecture holds that when reporting valuations as sellers, subjects are more 
likely to believe that the lottery outcome will be the higher payoff. Conversely, when 
subjects report valuations as buyers, they are more likely to believe that the lottery 
outcome will be the lower payoff. 
The question-influenced beliefs conjecture has implications for the issues of inter? 
est to ILS. It implies that observed WTP-WTA gaps might be due to a difference in 
the beliefs about outcomes that is influenced by the preference elicitation question. 
This suggests that observed gaps could be due to an uncontrolled, systematic shift? 
ing of beliefs as opposed to the shape of the preference relation EET assumes. The 
conjecture also has implications for the use of lotteries in the measurement of WTP 
WTA gaps. If misconceptions about the random device cannot be controlled, and in 
particular, if the systematic violation of sophisticated beliefs cannot be avoided, then 
there is an issue about the use of lotteries to measure WTP-WTA gaps, which assume 
that individuals value the same good as buyer and seller. If the roles of seller and 
buyer trigger a change in subjective probabilities for the same lottery, then from the 
subject's point of view the lottery valued from the buying perspective is not the same 
as the lottery valued from the selling perspective. Unless subjects view the good as 
the same good from both perspectives, or unless the standard theory can be adjusted 
to deal with this phenomenon, testing EET or even measuring a valuation gap using 
lotteries becomes difficult if not impossible. 
We note that the analysis offered here is focused on the boundary choices, the 
only cases in which beliefs can be clearly measured and separated from preferences. 
In an online Appendix we provide additional statistics related to the sensitivity of 
the WTP-WTA gap to the removal of the boundary values.19 Our conjecture is that 
the overall gap is influenced by the small set of valuations on or outside the bound? 
aries. We include in the online Appendix some insights about the literature related 
to controlling beliefs and the set of procedures a thorough application of revealed 
theory methodology might produce. Our hope is that the methods suggested by the 
literature will provide tools for removing the unwanted influences we detected in 
the lottery data, which discouraged us from using it to test theories such as EET. 
18Proportion of at-or-above the upper bound valuations in ILS's WTA rounds (7.3 percent) exceeded the pro? 
portion of at-or-above the upper bound valuations in ILS's WTP rounds (3.8 percent) (p 
= 0.02; one-tailed test). 
Similarly, 14 percent > 1.8 percent (/? 
= 
0.00); 7.7 percent > 3.2 percent (/? 
= 
0.02); and 5 percent > 0.9 percent 
(p 
= 
0.005). Using proportions from each round, we also conducted one-tailed tests of equal proportions to test 
whether subjects are more likely to report valuations at or above the upper bound in WTA rounds relative to WTP 
rounds. Five of the eight tests using ILS's data resulted in a statistically significant difference (at the 5 percent 
level); four of the six tests using our data produced similar results. 
19The online Appendix can be found at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php7doi-10.l257/aer.10L2A0l2. 
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D. Preference Consistency and Risk Preferences 
In footnote 15 (PZ 2005), we suggested problems related to subjects' ability to 
assign values to lotteries. In our data supplement, we were more explicit about the 
usefulness of the lottery data for testing theories such as EET. The footprints of 
misconceptions we reported included an analysis of risk preferences. Classical pros? 
pect theory holds that individual preferences are possibly risk averse in the gains 
and possibly risk seeking in the losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Individuals, 
however, are postulated to have consistent (complete and transitive) risk preferences 
given an endowment (or reference point). That is, risk preferences will change as 
the endowment changes, but, given the endowment, risk preferences are of a classi? 
cal type. Even neglecting the possibility that EET does not apply to lotteries, testing 
with data that violate these fundamental assumptions seems unhelpful. 
The problem we saw in our data, and that we see in ILS's data, is that subjects 
appear to exhibit shifting preferences and shifting risk attitudes as expectations and 
experience evolve. While modern theory might be able to accommodate such insta? 
bility, it presents a challenge to EET as it is traditionally developed and applied. 
Both ILS's and our subjects failed to exhibit stable risk preferences across rounds. 
For example, only 38 percent of ILS subjects consistently displayed risk aversion 
in all of the large-stakes buying rounds. Similarly, only 23 percent of our subjects 
consistently bid below the expected value of the lottery in every large-stakes buying 
round.20 While such proportions suggest that a large number of subjects had risk 
seeking preferences, very few subjects consistently bid the expected value or bid 
above the expected value in all of the large-stakes buying rounds.21 Thus, 53 percent 
of ILS's subjects and 64 percent of our subjects failed to exhibit consistent risk pref? 
erences in buying rounds. Such instability, the flopping back and forth between risk 
aversion and risk seeking behavior in WTP rounds, suggests a loss of experimen? 
tal control and suggests that, without insights about the nature of the randomness, 
the data are of questionable value for gap measurement and for theory testing. The 
same instability is observed in selling rounds, with 70 percent of ILS's subjects and 
72 percent of our subjects exhibiting inconsistent risk preference throughout those 
rounds.22 A natural hypothesis is that this general pattern of instability is related to 
the question-influenced beliefs conjecture, but we mention it only to bring the pos? 
sibility to the reader's attention since it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
In conclusion, it is important to remember that EET rests on a theory of pref? 
erences characterized by a specific kink at the reference point set by the endow? 
ment. Thus, if EET is tested using any data for which the reference point is known 
or assumed to be known, and if the data fail to exhibit consistent preferences, the 
20Risk aversion is commonly reported in experiments, so a lack of evidence of risk aversion (especially in 
buying rounds, as some versions of EET predict risk seeking behavior in selling rounds) signals a possible lack 
of experimental control. Of 400 large-stakes WTP valuations in ILS's study, 91 (23 percent) were above expected 
value. The results are starker if we include the small-stakes lotteries. In PZ's (2005) study, 63 (21 percent) of 
296 large-stakes WTP valuations were above expected value. This calls control into question in both experiments. 21 Three percent (8 percent) of ILS (PZ 2005) large-stakes lottery buyers bid the expected value each round. Six 
percent (5 percent) consistently bid above expected value in these buying rounds. 
22Eleven percent (5 percent) of ILS (PZ 2005) large-stakes lottery owners offered below expected value each 
round. Thirteen percent (11 percent) consistently offered above expected value in these rounds. Six percent (12 per? 
cent) consistently offered the expected value in these rounds. 
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theory is rejected. The lottery data might tell a useful story if applied to modern 
extensions of prospect theory, especially those assuming the reference point is set by 
something other than the endowment. Pointing to the lottery data as either support 
for or rejection of EET, however, would not be credible given that major features of 
the data disconfirm the basic assumptions of EET. 
IV. Explanations for Gaps: House Money Effect, 
Enhancement Effect Theory and Endowment Effect Theory 
Despite ILS's claim that they are "not concerned with testing any particular theo? 
retical account of WTP-WTA gaps" (ILS 2011, p. 995), they include expansive dis? 
cussions of possible explanations. Specifically, they offer two conjectures to explain 
the mug results reported both by us and by them. Both conjectures are problematic. 
We discuss them in turn and note that their second theory is simply a version of a 
more general theory we call enhancement effect theory, which holds that the process 
of acquisition and experience of ownership can create special features of goods that 
have independent value that can be confused with a kinked preference relation. 
A. The House Money Effect 
The first conjecture is that the elimination of the gap in mug rounds is due to a 
house money effect triggered not by cash from lottery winnings but by the show-up 
fee paid in cash at the beginning of the experiment. While this alternative explana? 
tion is worth considering, we note that it does not work to explain the broader set of 
results found in the literature. It also provides additional evidence to reject EET.23 
While ILS's results are suggestive, one should be hesitant to accept the house 
money effect explanation on the basis of this limited evidence. While ILS prefer not 
to formally test the conjecture, it could be tested in many ways, the most straightfor? 
ward of which would be to replicate KKT's (1990) gap result and then add a show 
up fee to the KKT (1990) procedures. The disappearance of the gap would serve 
as evidence of the house money effect conjecture. ILS, however, cannot perform 
this test because they have not produced a baseline using KKT's (1990) original 
procedures, which do not include a show-up fee but result in a gap. They claim 
that they performed a "controlled comparison between the PZ and KKT elicitation 
procedures" (ILS 2011, p. 1006), but they have not. Since ILS do not perform this 
experiment, the lack of a gap in their modified KKT (1990) experiment possibly 
is a result of a different subject pool or subtle differences between KKT's (1990) 
original procedures and ILS's modification of them. That is, it could be the case that 
KKT's (1990) results simply are not robust to slight changes in procedures, which 
would imply that EET does not explain gaps. 
Second, their explanation does not work well to explain the pattern of results 
reported in the literature. Experiments conducted by Stephanie Kovalchik et al. 
23 Of course, others might argue that, rather than rejecting EET, the evidence simply suggests that multiple 
effects exist and, in some cases, one effect will dominate the others. If this were the case, however, EET would 
need to be modified to take these other effects into account. This adaptation of the theory, however, would seriously 
compromise the effect's robustness and would call into question the myriad applications of EET. See Zeiler (2010) 
for numerous examples of applications in law. 
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(2005) employ the PZ (2005) procedures and do not observe a gap in mug valua? 
tions, yet they do not employ a show-up fee. This result is contrary to the predictions 
of the ILS conjecture that PZ's (2005) elimination of the gap is the result of a house 
money effect. In addition, the experiments performed by Alex Smith (2008) employ 
KKT's (1990) procedures but add a show-up fee. Contrary to the prediction of ILS's 
theory, Smith (2008) reports a valuation gap. Thus, the broader literature meets the 
ILS house money effect explanation of our mug gap with skepticism. 
B. Enhancement Effect Theory 
The second theory ILS advance to explain gaps observed in the lab is based on 
a blurring of EET with what we call "enhancement effect theory." Enhancements 
are generated through the process of endowment or the experience of ownership. 
Enhancements create value that is added to value that exists in the absence of the 
enhancement.24 For example, if the experimenter announces, "the mug is a gift" 
when endowing subjects, the nature of the good in the eyes of nonowners and own? 
ers might differ (PZ 2007). Potential buyers are deciding about a mug, while poten? 
tial sellers are deciding about a mug that was a gift from someone who will observe 
whether the "gift" is traded for something else. Sellers who benefit from signaling 
appreciation to the experimenter might be more likely to ask for more than they 
would if they were considering only the mug's consumption value. 
Examples of valuation gaps taken from the field demonstrate the potential for 
blurring enhancements and endowments. In the field, ownership is often associ? 
ated with enhancements that supplement, modify, and shape the value of a good 
for potential sellers. For example, a potential home seller values his home from the 
perspective of someone who has lived in it for some time. The independent value 
from enhancements that shape the seller's overall value could emerge from many 
unobservable sources or could manifest in observable ways (e.g., through the good 
memories that living there creates). Economic theory posits a number of sources of 
enhancements that might produce gaps, such as value associated with a trophy or 
the first dollar one earns, or values associated with information asymmetries (e.g., a 
risk-averse owner might place a higher value on the car she has been driving relative 
to an identical car that was previously owned by someone else simply because she is 
more certain about how her car impacts her utility). If we count unobserved beliefs 
as enhancements and if almost any behavior can be supported by some assumption 
about beliefs, it becomes difficult to separate EET from enhancement effect theory. 
Despite this difficulty, the question-influenced beliefs phenomenon we reported in 
Section III provides at least some opportunity for separation. 
Without the ability to control for enhancement effect theory as an alternative 
explanation, we are unable to determine whether a kink in the preference relation 
at the reference point is causing gaps observed in complex field environments, or 
24 In a separate study, we explore environments in which features of the experiment design generate enhancements 
that might add value to endowed goods (PZ 2007). Specifically, we tested what we now call enhancement effect 
theory against EET and found support for enhancement effect theory. While we focused on features that enhance 
the value of endowments in an effort to explain exchange asymmetries, we recognize the possibility that features of 
the environment might also reduce the value of the endowed good, possibly leading to buyer valuations that exceed 
seller valuations. 
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whether ownership (for more than just a few minutes) has somehow changed the 
nature of the good. It is hard to imagine an example taken from the field and used as 
support for EET that could not also be explained by some imagined but unobserved 
enhancement effect, including beliefs and expectations.25 Of course, this calls into 
question the falsifiability of enhancement effect theory when applied in the field. A 
similar problem, however, is a challenge to field applications of EET. Essentially 
any gap in the field also can be attributed to some unobserved reference point com? 
bined with loss aversion when in fact some enhancement or some systematically 
varying belief might be at work. 
The problems of distinguishing EET from enhancement effect theory naturally 
spill into the laboratory. For example, ILS criticize our instructions as biasing the 
results against EET by using the word "offer" as opposed to words like "buy" and 
"sell." They assert that such language "reduc[es] the salience of the distinction 
between buying and selling tasks" (ILS 2011, p. 1007). They argue that, while our 
subjects are told that they own the good, "there is little else to flag up the difference 
between buying and selling, whereas other experiments draw more attention to this 
difference" (ILS 2011, p. 1007). Enhancement effect theory predicts, however, that 
subjects might perceive the experimenter's emphasis of roles as information about 
the value of the goods (PZ 2007). Emphasis on "buyer" and "seller" roles can also 
trigger strategic instincts that cause sellers to offer high amounts and buyers to offer 
low amounts (PZ 2005). Therefore, if we emphasize buying and selling and we 
observe a gap, we cannot be sure whether the result supports EET or enhancement 
effect theory (or reversion to basic instincts).26 Similarly, ILS argue that placement 
of the good might impact the setting of the reference point, and that elimination of 
the gap in our experiment might be due to the fact that both sellers and buyers had 
mugs in front of them (ILS). Again, if we make such a change and observe a gap, 
enhancement effect theory cannot be ruled out because it suggests that placement of 
the goods might signal relative value (PZ 2007). Given that the theories are observa 
tionally equivalent in general settings, separation of them requires highly controlled 
laboratory settings. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
PZ (2005) draws a specific conclusion: EET does not explain the WTP-WTA 
gap observed in the classic mug experiments that were designed specifically to 
give the theory its best shot. ILS replicate this result, providing support for our 
central conclusion. 
That EET does not explain gaps does not tell us what does explain them. Our 
analyses (PZ 2005, 2007) offer two conjectures, both of which are related to experi? 
ment procedures. The first posits that gaps are due to misconceptions related to 
25 David Genesove and Christopher Mayer (2001) is an example demonstrating the possibility of separating loss 
aversion (with the purchase price as the reference point) from enhancement effect theory in a field environment. 
Enhancement effect theory seems not to explain the results, depending on assumptions made about beliefs. We 
thank the editor for bringing the example to our attention. 26 We should add that the forms subjects used to record valuations mentioned buying or selling more than once 
immediately prior to the elicitation of the offer. For example, the forms used to elicit valuations from buyers read: 
"Buyer Record Sheet: The experimenter owns one Round X lottery ticket. I will offer to buy the lottery ticket for 
an amount equal to the maximum I am willing to pay for the ticket" (emphasis added). 
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the elicitation mechanism. The second advances enhancement effect theory as an 
explanation. Enhancement effect theory holds that gaps arise from enhancements 
predicted by economic theory and generated by the method of endowment and, 
perhaps, by the elicitation procedures. While it was not their purpose, ILS's results 
add to the evidence we present here that lottery gaps are related to misconceptions 
about randomness and beliefs about probabilities produced by preference elicitation 
procedures. Thus, the ILS experiments bring into focus a dimension of misconcep? 
tions that we posited and that, upon further exploration, have been found to raise 
questions about the appropriateness of interpreting observed lottery gaps as reveal? 
ing preferences for the same item in the selling role and in the buying role. 
PZ (2005) makes clear that we were curious about experimental procedures and 
associated misconceptions. Our observation related to the nature of goods was (and 
is) that others have focused on the properties of the endowed good (e.g., the differ? 
ence between mugs and money or tokens for money) as an explanation for gaps, 
suggesting that the disparity in gap results that we highlighted in Table 1 in PZ 
(2005) is caused by the lack of comparability of different properties (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991). The conclusion of PZ (2005) was that the mug experiments do not 
support theories based on the properties of goods formulated to explain the disparity 
of results across experiments. The claims we make here about the different nature of 
lotteries are unrelated to our previous claim. Here we argue that properties of goods, 
such as the randomness associated with lotteries, might carry an inherent possibility 
of misconceptions, which might lead to gaps. Indeed, our analysis of ILS's and our 
lottery data supports the view that misconceptions play a role in producing lottery 
gaps and that different goods might call for different controls for misconceptions. 
Just as we argued in PZ (2005), however, a full understanding and appropriate test 
of our conjecture will require an application of revealed theory methodology, which 
neither ILS nor we applied. 
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